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I. Introduction
Capturing the impact of military spending on economic growth in
developing countries has been an elusive problem for defense economists
and has not been fully investigated by development economists. A review
article by Deger and Sen (1995) notes that the Handbook of Developmental
Economics rarely mentions the role of military spending in economic
development. Ram’s (1995) comprehensive review of empirical studies in
the defense economics literature reveals conflicting empirical implications
arising from disparate attempts at quantifying the defense burden on economic
growth.  He notes that a lack of consensus among both theoretical and empirical
studies regarding the proper model specification has led to this diverse array
of empirical results.
In this paper, we integrate implications stemming from many competing
defense burden models gleaned from the defense economics literature into a
simple growth specification. Our model allows various avenues for the defense
burden on economic growth to be revealed empirically. Using panel data from
African and Latin American countries over the period of 1975 to 1989 we
find empirical evidence that the defense burden in these countries has a non-
linear influence on economic growth, changing from positive to negative as
military spending represents an ever-higher proportion of GNP.  We also find
that the influence of military labor use on growth is similarly non-linear and
depends upon the level of male educational attainment in a country. These
empirical results were obtained while controlling for cross-country variation
in certain political and economic institutional characteristics.
The framework for our model is developed by modifying a specification
designed by Robert Barro (1991), and further extended in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) and Barro (1997).
1  We are compelled to use Barro’s neoclassical
model of economic growth as a starting point because his growth specification
includes variables designed to control for differences in institutional influences
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to Barro pertain to his 1997 study.331 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
across countries. The theoretical consideration of the influence of institutional
structure and public policy on economic growth has been explored by notable
political economists such as Friedman (1962), Olson (1982), and North (1990),
among others.
More recently, empirical work by Dawson (1998) examines a set of
economic freedom indexes for countries worldwide that have been developed
by Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1995) and the relative level of political
freedoms developed by Gastil (1987). These indexes are aggregations of
various measures reflecting cross-country variation in the level of institutional
arrangements that directly affect the economic and political freedoms,
respectively, enjoyed by the citizens of each country. Dawson finds robust
empirical support that the aggregated economic indexes, but not the political
indexes, successfully explained a significant amount of the variation in
economic growth across countries. Gastil (1987) generates indexes measuring
relative levels of political freedoms across countries and found evidence that
greater levels of such freedoms promote economic prosperity.  However, few
empirical studies of institutional influences on economic growth specifically
address how a nation’s military sector—which we feel is an important
institutional influence on the national economy—can affect growth.
 For example, Barro’s specification controls for variation in the size of
central government as an explanatory variable for growth. The particular
variable he chooses for central government spending does not include
education and military expenditures. Barro’s intention is to include an
explanatory variable that reflects total central government expenditures, but
removes from those expenditures any funds used for producing services that
are often considered “public goods” in an economics sense. The remaining
expenditures are intended to proxy the extent to which the central government
wastes productive resources via economically inefficient policies and
institutional arrangements that hinder economic growth.
2 Yet, Barrow’s
2 Studies by Scully (1989) and Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson (1998) find empirical
evidence that countries with larger central governments relative to their GNP do tend to
grow more slowly than those countries with relatively smaller government sectors.332 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
removal of military spending from total central government expenditures in
this manner also creates an interesting opportunity for isolating the impact
that military displacement of productive resources might have on a nation’s
rate of economic growth. Quantifying the extent of the defense burden on
national economic growth in Africa and Latin America is the very question
we pursue in the following empirical investigation.
The next section is a brief review of previous theoretical and empirical
work within the defense economics literature regarding the relationship
between military sector resource use and national economic growth. Several
theories are examined regarding the direct and indirect influences that military
spending and labor use might have on growth. We propose a simple model
that integrates many of the different implications stemming from these various
perspectives of the defense burden on growth and we motivate how military
resource use is likely to have a non-linear influence on economic growth.
The third section introduces our augmented specification of Barro’s
neoclassical growth model. We attempt to quantify how defense spending
and military use of labor influences economic growth using panel data analysis.
The defense burden on growth is measured by military spending relative to
the size of the national economy as well as by the proportion of the total
population actively participating in the military sector.
The fourth section reviews our panel data analysis results, derived from
44 countries in Africa and Latin America over three consecutive, five-year
growth periods from 1975 to 1989.  We find evidence that the defense burden
on economic growth in these developing countries is non-linear. When the
size of the military sector in a country is relatively small relative to the economy,
defense spending seems to have a positive but diminishing influence on
economic growth. However, this influence soon turns negative as defense
spending represents a higher proportion of the country’s economy. We also
find that military use of labor is non-linear. While military labor use may
have a positive influence on economic growth at low levels of labor force
participation, this influence would eventually turn negative at higher levels333 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
of labor force use. We also find that any positive influence arising out of
military use of labor diminishes significantly as the level of male educational
attainment in a country increases.
Lastly, we explore the robustness of the panel data results.  It appears that
the longitudinal dimension of the panel data, rather than the cross-sectional
dimension, exerts the stronger influence over our empirical results. Our
analysis also indicates that there is little statistical support for considering the
data from the African and Latin American regions separately.
II.  Describing the Impact of Defense on Economic Growth
Deger and Sen (1995) and Ram (1995) provide comprehensive theoretical
and empirical reviews, respectively, of the defense economics literature as it
relates to analyzing the defense burden on economic growth. Interest in this
area of research was initially motivated by Benoit’s (1973) unexpected
empirical finding that military spending appeared to increase economic growth
in many developing countries. Ram summarizes how subsequent empirical
investigations into this issue have produced wide-ranging statistical results,
most of which could not duplicate Benoit’s findings.
Deger and Sen attribute this empirical inconsistency across studies to the
lack of consensus among authors as to the proper theoretical avenue of how
military spending influences economic growth. As a result, empirical
specifications tend to be narrow in scope in an attempt to measure a specific
channel of influence, thereby causing the model specifications to vary widely
across different studies. Additionally, the analysis is often conducted using
data sets within narrow time frames and/or small cross sections of data. Deger
and Sen conclude that any meta-analysis of these many empirical implications
would be a formidable challenge, yet they attempt to collect what could loosely
be termed a “consensus view” of the many potential influences that military
resource use may have on a nation’s economic growth. They also make some
specific suggestions for further refinement of research efforts in this area.334 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
A. Theoretical Issues in the Defense Burden Literature
With respect to the theoretical treatment of the defense burden issue, Deger
and Sen summarize the direct opportunity costs to economic activity from
military resource use that have appeared in previous studies. This list includes
lower levels of private sector investment and domestic savings, diminished
domestic consumption due to lower aggregate demand, and a smaller tax
base available for providing needed civilian, public sector services—each of
which is expected to directly and negatively influence economic growth. They
also note that many studies describe various indirect costs that military resource
use might have on growth. For example, the private sector business investment
may be crowded out due to higher prevailing interest rates in the economy
when the military sector is financed primarily through deficit spending.
Domestic savings may further decline from the loss of public sector services
or transfer payments that must compete with the military for tax revenues.
The increased displacement of a well-educated workforce into military service
also deprives the civilian sector of the use of labor and its human capital,
further decreasing economic growth. Therefore, if one assumes that declining
marginal productivity prevails in the civilian sector of a nation’s economy,
then the magnitude of these direct and indirect opportunity costs to economic
growth should increase at an increasing rate as the military sector uses a
greater portion of a nation’s available productive resources.
Yet, there remains the possibility that the military sector may have some
positive, indirect effects on economic growth as well. Deger and Sen note
that various studies have considered whether technology spin-offs arising
from defense weapons production in countries with capital intensive military
sectors might enhance growth. Additionally, innovations in management and
logistics within large scale supply and support operations can be experienced
by economies that boast a larger military sector. These innovations could be
carried over to the private or civilian public sectors, enhancing civilian sector
production and distribution efficiency, and positively influence the rate of
economic growth in that country.335 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
With respect to public sector productivity, many developing countries use
military labor to build public infrastructure projects or provide services
(highways, police services, and water projects) that are not considered typical
military sector activities in developed countries. From a human capital
standpoint, a relatively uneducated and disenfranchised young male workforce
could benefit from a brief stint serving in military service if such training
afforded opportunities for learning self-discipline, problem solving techniques
and effective communication skills that are otherwise not available to them in
the civilian sector. Therefore, if one assumes that diminishing marginal
productivity prevails in the military sector of the economy as well, then the
magnitude of these benefits to economic growth would increase at a decreasing
rate (and, perhaps, eventually turn negative) as the military sector uses a greater
portion of a nation’s available productive resources.
The underlying model of this paper is the result of an effort to unify these
many disparate concepts of how military spending can influence economic
growth, and to do so in the most robust way possible. Figure 1, below, illustrates
how military resource use is theorized to influence the growth rate of a nation’s
economy when assuming diminishing returns to all sectors of the economy.
As the proportion of a country’s productive resources diverted to the military
sector increases, the total direct and indirect opportunity costs (lost economic
growth) in the civilian sector will increase at an increasing rate. However, the
total indirect benefits (additional economic growth) arising from military use
of those resources will simultaneously increase at a decreasing rate.  Summing
these two functions to find the net influence of military resource use on
economic growth reveals a non-linear, concave defense burden function
describing the relationship between the size of the military sector and economic
growth in the national economy.
This simple model of the defense burden on economic growth implies
that when the military sector is very small relative to the entire economy, the
net effect on economic growth may be positive. As more of a country’s
resources are diverted to military use, this positive influence on economic
growth reaches some maximum influence at point M

















Figure 1. The Defense Burden Function
influence on growth then declines as military spending continues to expand,
eventually turning negative after point M
2. We use panel data from Latin
American and African countries in an attempt to empirically estimate the
specific shape of this defense burden function with respect to both military
spending and labor use.
B.  Empirical Issues in the Defense Burden Literature
With respect to the empirical studies, Ram performs a comprehensive
review of the defense economics literature and makes many general
recommendations for future research in quantifying the influence of military
resource use on economic growth. For instance, he notes that most studies
focus on military spending while few studies address the specific opportunity337 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
cost to the civilian sector of the economy when labor and it’s inherent human
capital are diverted into military service. Ram also encourages testing the
sensitivity of any empirical results across different time periods and geographic
samples to verify the robustness of any theoretical postulates. He further
suggests using at least five-year long growth periods to better capture the
total influence that increased military resource use might have on economic
growth. Our objective in the following empirical analysis is to satisfy these
concerns regarding empirical research into the effects of the defense burden
on economic growth in the countries of Latin America and Africa.
III.  Modifying the Barro Model to Reflect the Impact of Defense
on Growth
The dependent variable of our growth model specification is defined as
the annual rate of growth in real, per-capita GDP (measured in decimal form)
averaged over a five-year period. The economic growth and explanatory
variables common to the Barro model come directly from the Barro-Lee
database.
3 Data on defense spending (as a percent of GNP) and military
personnel (as a percent of the population) are taken from the annual report
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, published annually by the
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (various years).
The value of each explanatory variable in our specification represents the
data at the initial year of each five-year growth period of the dependent variable,
or represents data that is a calculated average over the five-year period prior
to the growth period of the dependent variable. This helps control for the
potential of reverse causality, such as economic growth causing greater military
spending. Data reflecting the three time periods of 1975-1979, 1980-1984,
and 1985-1989 are analyzed for a sample of 44 African and Latin American
countries. A list of the countries used in our analysis appears in the Appendix
3 These data are available at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/Growth/barlee.htm.338 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
and includes all countries for which data were available for each explanatory
variable used in our specification.
A.  Using the Barro Model of Economic Growth as a Foundation
Our growth model specification starts with the basic components of Barro’s
neoclassical growth model as explanatory variables. The initial level of real,
per-capita GDP (GDP) is included in log form to capture the empirically
observed income-convergence effect on growth, where poorer countries tend
to grow faster than richer countries. The average number of years of adult
male educational attainment (EDUC) and the average years of life expectancy
(LIFE) are both included in log form as proxy measures for the level of human
capital in the labor force in each country. The log of the fertility rate (FERT)
is also included as a proxy measure for the growth rate of the labor force in a
country.  Barro included this variable to reflect the negative impact on growth
that arises from a low capital-to-labor ratio associated with those countries
experiencing over-population pressures.
Barro included variables designed to capture the influence of economic
and political institutions on economic growth, and we include similar variables
to control for these influences as well. The explanatory variable GOV
represents central government expenditures, less education and military
expenditures, expressed as a ratio of GDP and enters the specification in log
form. Barro’s intent was to eliminate those public expenditures in central
government spending that are being used for providing “public goods” in the
economic sense. The remaining expenditures captured by GOV proxy the
potential for governments to use available resources for enacting economically
unproductive public sector policies.
Barro also included a democracy index developed by Gastil (1987). This
qualitative ranking reflects the ability of a country’s citizens to influence
outcomes through direct political participation, and is measured as an index
on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 (with 1 being the most democratic country
ranking possible). Barro includes this index as an explanatory variable in339 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
quadratic form in order to capture the non-linear influence of democratic
freedoms on growth. He theorizes that when democratic freedoms in a country
are very low, any increase in these freedoms would help citizens constrain
government leaders’ ability to amass personal wealth through unpopular and
unproductive public policies favoring those in power. However, after some
level of democratic freedom is achieved, Barro surmises that further increases
in such democratic freedoms would allow for substantial income or wealth
redistribution policies to be implemented by the majority at the expense of
the minority. He notes that such redistribution efforts—usually under the guise
of taking resources away from the rich to subsidize the poor, such as land
reform measures—can have a stifling effect on economic activity and growth.
Barro’s empirical investigation included developed nations as well as
developing nations. Since developed countries have higher levels of democratic
freedoms than most developing countries, and since our investigation is limited
to the developing countries of Latin America and Africa, we include this
democracy index (DEMOC) as an explanatory variable only in linear form.
4
We also include private investment as a ratio of GDP in log form (INV) in
deference to existing empirical models used in the defense economics and
development economics literature. Barro’s specification did not include private
investment in his specification since his empirical analysis indicated that such
investment may be endogenously determined by the level of economic growth
rather than growth being determined by investment. Since the omission of
investment in his model contrasts with most other empirical models of
economic growth, including most of those models found within the defense
economics literature, we include it in our specification.  However, the empirical
results for all of the other variables in our specification were not sensitive to
the inclusion of this explanatory variable.
Barro’s empirical analysis confirmed Okun’s (1971) findings that price
inflation is associated with increased price level variability over time, and
4 Our empirical analysis did not statistically support a quadratic form for DEMOC.340 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
that both of these characteristics were found to hinder economic growth
independently. In order to control for cross-country variation in institutional
monetary policies that exacerbate inflation, our specification includes the
annual growth rate of the M1 money supply less the rate of growth in potential
GDP, as averaged over the proceeding five-year period of growth
(M1GROW).
5 In this way, the explanatory variable is not reflecting the
variability of price inflation, but rather reflects evidence of poor policies that
may cause inflation.
Barro’s analysis also confirmed that variation in inflation from year to
year diminished economic growth in a non-linear way. In light of this, our
specification includes the standard deviation for annual inflation over the
previous five years (INFL),
6 as well as its squared value (INFLSQR), to account
for any non-linearity of this influence on growth.
B.  Adding the Military Sector into our Specification
We now address the issue of including the effects of military resource use
on economic growth in our specification. Military expenditures expressed as
a percent of GNP (MS) in the initial year of each growth period is used as an
explanatory variable to capture the influence on economic growth from military
spending. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, the positive effects on economic
growth arising from increased military spending would eventually be
dominated by the opportunity costs of diverting resources away from the
civilian sector of the economy, potentially turning the net effect of military
spending on growth from positive to negative.
7 Therefore, we use a quadratic
5 This measure is calculated by Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1995) and is used as an
indicator of institutional economic policy when calculating their aggregated economic
freedom indexes.
6 This variable is also taken from Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1995).
7 Empirical support for a non-linear relationship between military resource use and growth
can also be found in Frederiksen and Looney (1995). Dividing a small sample of developing341 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
functional form and include the squared value of MS (MSSQR) in our
specification as well.
Landau (1994) theorized that if public sector decision-makers perceive an
increase in the threat to national security arising from a military build-up in a
neighboring country, these decision makers may also have a heightened
awareness of the increased opportunity cost of maintaining any unproductive
government policies. Policy makers in such a scenario would have greater
appreciation for how self-serving economic policies shrink the potential tax
base from which they desire to fund an increase in military capacity, such that
more economically efficient public sector policies may be implemented while
the government simultaneously increases defense spending. In light of this,
Landau found empirical support for the idea that heightened perceptions of
external security threats motivated more productive uses of available resources
in the civilian, public sector. The resulting increase in economic growth was
observed despite the simultaneous increases in defense spending, illustrating
the complex nature of interpreting the empirical statistical correlation between
military spending and economic growth.
In our specification, we assume that heightened perceptions of national
security threats could stem from either external or internal sources, such as
the threat of a pending domestic revolutionary movement. Therefore, we
assume that a heightened perception of either internal or external threats is
ultimately exhibited by a relative higher level of defense spending as a ratio
of GNP. In light of this, the product of GOV (which excludes defense and
education spending) and MS creates the explanatory variable MSGOV, and
is included in our specification. The coefficient estimate for MSGOV can
then be interpreted as capturing the added productivity (or the diminished
inefficiency) of civilian, public sector resource use that occurs when higher
countries into two sub-groups—one with high capitalization economies and one with low
capitalization economies—they found that the difference in the influence exerted by military
resource use on growth across the two groups was statistically significant at conventional
levels of confidence.342 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
levels of military spending occur simultaneously with higher levels of civilian
government spending.
Finally, we turn toward the military use of the labor force. The percent of
a nation’s population devoted to the military sector (MP) is also included as
an explanatory variable in our model specification.
8 As Figure 1 illustrates,
the net influence of increasing military use of resources on economic growth
is presumed to be non-linear, and we therefore include the squared value of
MP (MPSQR). From a human capital perspective, displacing young men from
the private sector workforce for military service (perhaps through conscription)
when the average level of male educational attainment and human capital is
relatively high would create a significant opportunity cost to the civilian
economy and decrease economic growth.
9 Yet, if the average level of male
educational attainment and human capital of the young male workforce is
relatively low, then military training may create a net positive influence on
economic growth when an economy gains enduring human capital at the
temporary expense of lost labor resources (Blomberg, 1997). In this light we
include the product of MP and EDUC (MPEDUC) as an interaction variable.
In this way, we use the level of EDUC to control for the degree of human
capital lost to the civilian sector when a given amount of the labor force is
used by the military sector. A negative coefficient on MPEDUC can be
interpreted as measuring the extra opportunity cost to the civilian sector
economy due to military displacement of human capital, which is in addition
to the opportunity cost of displaced labor.
8 Although one would expect that the portion of the population in the military and the level
of military expenditures relative to GDP to be highly correlated, the correlation coefficient
between MS and MP in our sample is only 0.59.
9  A dummy variable for conscription (vice voluntary enlistment) was included for each
country in all regression specifications and was found to be insignificant.  Additionally,
none of the remaining variables were found to be sensitive to the inclusion of this variable
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IV.  The Empirical Evidence
In the Appendix, we present descriptive statistics for all the explanatory
variables used in our specification (for the entire sample as well as for each
of the two continental regions). Our sample is (roughly) divided evenly
between the two continents, but many countries in Northern Africa are not
represented due to lack of available data for some of the variables used in our
specification. Thus, the empirical results interpreted below may be more
applicable to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa rather than to all of Africa.
Table 1 shows the results of the panel data analysis for the set of 44 countries
of Africa and Latin America. Three separate five-year growth intervals were
used covering the period 1975-1989, for a total of 129 observations.
10 Recall
that the dependent variable is the annual rate of growth in real GNP per-
capita (in decimal form) averaged over each five-year period, and is explained
by the 16 independent variables, as defined above. This fixed-effects approach
includes time period and country-specific dummy variables, such that full
advantage of the panel data can be realized while controlling for any
heterogeneity in the longitudinal and/or cross-sectional dimension of the panel
data. Additionally, a heteroskedasticity consistent matrix estimator of the
covariance matrix, based on White (1980), is used to generate unbiased
standard errors for inferencing procedures.
Our primary focus is on the first equation (EQ1) in Table 1. The adjusted
R-squared statistic indicates that this specification explains about three fourths
of the total variation in the dependant variable. All of the coefficient estimates
from the economic, institutional and demographic variables that are common
to Barro’s (1997) growth model are of the expected sign, and all but one
(LIFE) are found to be statistically significant at the traditional 5% level of
confidence.
11
10 The panel is slightly unbalanced due to a single missing observation point for two separate
nations in two different time periods.
11 The positive and significant coefficient estimate on M1GROW suggests that an increase344 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 1. Panel Data Results for three Continuous Five-Year  Periods for
44 Countries (Dependent Variable: Average Annual Change in Real Per-
Capita GDP)
      EQ1    EQ2      EQ3
GDP -0.1778 *** -0.0112 -0.2038 ***
(0.0178) (0.0070) (0.0226)
INV 0.0153 * 0.0154 ** 0.0195 *
(0.0093) (0.0065) (0.0110)
GOV -0.0552 ** -0.0054 -0.0535 *
(0.0232) (0.0137) (0.0315)
EDUC 0.1028 *** 0.0032 0.0715 **
(0.0264) (0.0089) (0.0296)
LIFE 0.1156 -0.0123 -0.3059 **
(0.1425) (0.0461) (0.1352)
FERT -0.1276 *** -0.0188 -0.0628 *
(0.0335) (0.0212) (0.0368)
M1GROW 0.0004 *** 0.0003 ** 0.0003 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
INFL -0.0002 *** -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ***
(3.3E-05) (7.07E-05) (3.92E-05)
INFLSQR 4.21E-08 *** 2.92E-08 ** 3.32E-6 ***
(6.4E-09) (1.32E-09) (7.35E-08)
MS 0.0360 *** 0.0185 0.0348 **
(0.0117) (0.0129) (0.0165)
MSSQR -0.0008 ** -0.0010 ** -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
MSGOV 0.0198 *** 0.0094 * 0.0208 ***
(0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0079)
MP 0.4651 *** 0.0813 0.3216 **
(0.1187) (0.0624) (0.1480)345 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
A. Summarizing the Results of the Panel Data Analysis for the Military
Variables
With respect to military spending, the positive and significant coefficient
on MS and negative and significant coefficient on MSSQR supports our non-
Table 1. (Continue) Panel Data Results for three Continuous Five-Year
Periods for 44 Countries (Dependent Variable: Average Annual Change
in Real Per-Capita GDP)
      EQ1    EQ2      EQ3
MPSQR -0.1113 *** 0.0142 -0.1170 **
(0.0400) (0.0285) (0.0551)
MPEDUC -0.2581 *** -0.0508 * -0.1499 **
(0.0630) (0.0290) (0.0744)
DEMOC -0.0062 ** -0.0030 -0.0003
(0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0029)
Time dummies? Yes Yes No
Country dummies? Yes No Yes
R Squared 0.88 0.40 0.82
Adj. R Squared 0.77 0.30 0.66
No. of obs. 129 129 129
Mean of dep. var. 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
Notes: * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% level, respectively.  Standard error of the coefficient
estimate appears in parenthesis.
in the growth of the money supply relative to real, potential GDP will improve economic
growth if it does not increase price level variation (as controlled for by INFL).  The net
impact of price variation over time is found to be negative for the entire range of values of
M1GROW and INFL in our sample.346 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
linear model of the defense burden on economic growth. Low levels of military
spending appear to generate a positive influence on economic growth despite
the opportunity costs to the civilian economy associated with military spending,
but higher levels of military spending appear to generate sufficient opportunity
costs to eventually dominate any indirect benefits from military spending.
(The net influence of military spending on growth for the average country in
our panel data sample is quantified explicitly below.)
The net influence of government spending on growth also depends upon
the interaction term of GOV with military spending (MSGOV). MSGOV
generates a positive and significant coefficient estimate while GOV generates
a negative and significant estimate. This implies that while the net effect of
civilian government spending on growth is still negative (as calculated at the
average level of military spending in our sample), the synergy between
simultaneously high levels of civilian government spending and military
spending tends to diminish the negative influence that a given amount of
military spending has on economic growth. This empirical result supports
Landau’s conjecture that a heightened perception of military threat by the
government can be statistically correlated with that government using civilian,
public sector resources more efficiently via more efficient public policies
enacted to retain the tax base necessary for military expansion.
With respect to military use of labor, the coefficient estimate on MP is
positive and significant while MPSQR generates a negative coefficient (though
significant only at the 10% level of confidence). This indicates that military
use of labor seems to have a positive influence on growth at relatively low
levels of labor participation in the military. The sign and magnitude of MPSQR
indicates that this positive influence eventually turns negative as more labor
is diverted to the military.  (The net influence of military labor use on economic
growth for the average country in our sample is quantified explicitly below.)
The negative and significant coefficient estimate on MPEDUC implies
that when the military draws its labor from an better-educated male work
force, any positive influence that such military labor use may have on a nation’s
economic growth is diminished. This dampening effect is due to the increased347 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
loss of human capital from the civilian sectors of the economy for a given
amount of military labor use. The net effect of male educational attainment
on economic growth is still positive when calculated at our sample’s average
level of military labor force participation.
B.  Deriving the Marginal Impact of the Defense Burden Function
Due to the functional form of our growth model specification, which
includes some multiplicative interaction terms among the explanatory
variables, the net effects on economic growth of government spending,
education, military spending or military labor participation are not inherently
obvious. Therefore, Table 2 presents the ceteris paribus net impact that a one-
unit increase in each explanatory variable is expected to have on annual
economic growth, as calculated at the value of the sample mean for each
related explanatory variable in our specification.
For example, if the dependent variable in our growth model is expressed
as Y, taking the partial derivative of Y with respect to MS can approximate
Table 2. Net Impact on Growth, as Evaluated at the Sample Mean











Notes: All estimates are based on EQ1 in Table 1; a evaluated at mean value of MS (2.58)
b evaluated  at  mean  value  of  MP  (0.332);  c evaluated at mean value of INFL (81.54);
d evaluated at mean value of MS (2.58) and GOV (-1.77); e evaluated at mean value of MP
(0.332) and EDUC (1.15); ***  = 1% level.348 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
the marginal impact of a change in military spending on annual growth. The
result is illustrated by Equation (1) below:
dY/dMS  =  b
MS  +  (2  b
MSSQR  MS)  +  (b
MSGOV  GOV)                    (1)
Using this equation, we can now calculate the average affect of a one-
percentage point increase in military spending on annual economic growth.
Inserting the sample means of military spending for the variable MS (2.52%
of GNP) and central government spending for the variable GOV (17% of
GNP, entered in log form) into Equation (1) reveals that the net impact of a
one percentage point increase in military spending results in a 0.32% decline
in annual growth. This may seem a rather small reduction, but it should be
compared to the annual growth rate in our panel data sample of only 0.2% per
year. However, if we insert the level of military spending at the sample average
plus one sample standard deviation (4.55% of GNP), then the negative impact
of a one percentage point increase in military spending becomes a substantial
7.2% reduction in average annual economic growth.
Proceeding as above, the partial derivative of the dependent variable Y
with respect to MP can be expressed by Equation (2) below:
dY/dMp  =  b
MP  +  (2 b
MPSQR  MP)  +  (b
MPEDUC  EDUC)                    (2)
Using this equation, we can now calculate how a one-percentage point
increase in military labor use would impact annual economic growth on
average.  Inserting the sample mean of military labor use for the variable MP
(0.33% of population) and the sample mean of adult male educational
attainment for the variable EDUC (3.18 years of primary education, entered
in log form) into Equation (2) reveals that a one-percentage point increase in
military labor use causes a substantial 9.43% annual increase in economic
growth. However, a one-percentage point increase in military labor use is a
rather large change, considering that the standard deviation of our panel data349 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
sample is only ¼ of a percentage point. Therefore, Equation (2) indicates that
the influence of a change in military labor use of one standard deviation can
be expected to cause a 2.4% increase in annual growth. The empirical result
implied by Equation (2) lends empirical support for the idea that a brief stint
in the military may allow young men to gain productive skills and discipline
that could not otherwise be had in the civilian sector and that these skills
positively impact economic growth.
Looking again at the theoretical shape of the defense burden function
illustrated in Figure 1, the empirical findings for MS and MP that are illustrated
in Table 2 can be brought into better perspective. The positive value of the
partial derivative of MP on economic growth (as calculated with Equation
(2) and evaluated at the average level of MP and EDUC) implies that the
average country in our sample is somewhere to the left of point M
1 
on the
defense burden function. We can therefore conclude that military labor use
appears to be exerting a net positive influence on economic growth when
evaluated at the sample average of our panel data and controlling for the level
of adult male educational attainment. The negative value of the partial
derivative of MS on growth (as calculated with Equation 1 and evaluated at
the sample average level of MS and GOV) implies that the average country
in our sample is to the right of M
1 on the graph.
The influence of the other variables involved in the military interactions
is evaluated at the mean values of the sample data, and is reported in Table 2.
The figures in Table 2 illustrate that the net effect of civilian government
spending (GOV) on growth is negative, despite the positive influence on
growth, possibly from the Landau effect, when military and civilian
government spending (MSGOV) are simultaneously high. Finally, the net
influence of male education levels on growth remains positive, despite the
negative influence of simultaneously higher levels male education attainment
and military labor force use (MPEDUC).350 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
C.  Deriving the Positive-to-Negative Cross-Over Point of the Defense
Burden Function
Our analysis of the non-linear defense burden function to determine the
marginal impact of a percentage point change in MS or MP on economic
growth begs the question: When does military spending and military labor
use change from a positive influence on economic growth to a negative
influence? We now turn to estimating the location of point M
2 on the defense
burden function illustrated in Figure 1 for both military spending and military
labor use. If we insert the sample means for all of the explanatory variables
other than MS into our specification, we can then set the specification equal
to zero and solve for the value of MS that satisfies this equation. Since the
variable enters into the equation in quadratic form (and being careful to account
for the cross product variable MSGOV), solving the quadratic function for
MS reveals the maximum level of GNP that can be used for military spending
without causing a drag on economic growth. Our empirical analysis of our
sample indicates that the influence of military spending on growth becomes
negative at 6.8% of GNP.  This ratio appears to be relatively high considering
that our sample mean for military spending is only 2.6% of GNP with a
standard deviation of almost 2%.
If we insert the sample means for all of the explanatory variables other
than MP into our specification, we can then solve for the value of MP. Since
this variable also enters into the equation in quadratic form (and being careful
to account for the cross product variable MPEDUC), solving the quadratic
function for MP reveals that the influence of military labor use on growth
becomes negative at 8.32% of GNP. This ratio appears to be very high
considering that our sample mean for military labor use is only 0.33% of
GNP with a standard deviation of 0.26%. As stated earlier, this result is most
likely driven from the lack of education and training opportunities available
to young men in the civilian sector of the economy for most countries in our
sample.351 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
D.  Examining the Robustness of the Panel Data Results
The robustness of the panel data results can be explored to investigate
whether information from the longitudinal or cross-sectional dimension of
the panel data appears to be driving the statistical results. The second equation
(EQ2) of Table 1 drops the country specific dummies while retaining the
three separate time dimension dummies.
12 This allows the pooled, cross-
sectional dimension of the panel data to influence the coefficient estimates
while controlling for separate time periods. The adjusted R-squared statistic
indicates that less than one-third of the observed variation in economic growth
is explained by this specification, with only three of the military related
variables remaining statistically significant (although a Wald test indicates
that the MS and MSSQR variables are simultaneously significant at the 10%
level).
The third equation of Table 1 (EQ3) also uses the same specification as
EQ1, but this time the time dummy variables are dropped while the country
dummies are retained. This allows the pooled, time dimension of the panel
data to influence the coefficient estimates while controlling for the influence
12 We also looked directly at the results of three separate, cross-sectional regression
specifications, one for each time period. Degrees of freedom concerns necessitated our
dropping the country specific effects from the regressions but we replaced them with regional
dummy variables for the African and Latin American continents, as commonly employed
in the growth literature (e.g. Barro [1991, 1997] and Blomberg [1996]). The regional
dummies are significantly different from each other in the latter two time periods at the 5%
confidence level.  Many of the explanatory variables in each of these three equations produce
coefficient estimates of the expected signs, including each of those few variables that achieve
statistical significance in any given cross-section. However, none of these latter coefficients
retain their significance across all three of the time periods. These combined results attest
to the relative weakness of the cross-sectional dimension of the panel data to influence the
statistical results as compared to the longitudinal dimension. The military variables are
jointly, though typically not individually, significant. This again suggests the importance
of the panel data approach to find evidence of the more complex interactions we are
modeling. The pooled regression specification of EQ1 generates lower standard errors for
every coefficient estimate.352 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
of each country separately. The adjusted R-squared statistic for this equation
indicates that two-thirds of the variation in growth is explained with this
specification and all but one of the military variables produce significant
estimates, all of which are of the predicted sign.
Comparing the three specifications in Table 1 is also revealing.  Retaining
the country dummies to control for cross-sectional variation and letting the
pooled longitudinal information influence the coefficient estimates in EQ3
creates coefficient estimates that are more in line with the fixed-effects panel
model of EQ1.
13 Only MSSQR and GASTIL fail to retain their same level of
significance in EQ3. Yet, retaining the time dummies to control for longitudinal
variation and letting the pooled cross-sectional information influence these
same estimates, as in EQ2, generates results that are much less reflective of
EQ1. This comparison supports Ram’s speculation that the longitudinal
information in statistical analysis would be necessary to extract robust
empirical results regarding the influence of military sector size on economic
growth. However, this comparison goes against Barro’s (1997) findings that
cross-sectional information appears to be the dominant influence determining
the coefficient estimates of his growth model.
Finally, we address whether any regional differences might exist between
the two continents. We do so by using the panel data analysis for each continent
separately, and in each case the same specification as EQ1 was used (including
both the time period and country-specific dummy variables) to determine
whether these complex effects were robust across both regions separately.
The two equations in Table 3 illustrate that not all of the institutional and
military effects on growth are statistically significant in each region separately,
though all of the signs of the coefficient estimates on the military variables
are of the anticipated direction.
 Many of the coefficients on the neoclassical growth and economic policy
variables are not significant at conventional levels of confidence for the sub-
13  An F-test of the time dummies indicates that they remain jointly significant at the one-
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Table 3. Region Specific Panel Results
Africa Latin America
GDP -0.1572 *** -0.2357 ***
(0.0250) (0.0238)
INV 0.0236 0.0514 ***
(0.0149) (0.0178)
GOV 0.0201 * -0.0730 **
(0.0369) (0.0327)




FERT -0.1990 *** -0.0559
(0.0501) (0.0495)
M1GROW 0.0005 ** 0.0003 ***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
INFL -0.0011 -0.0002 ***
(0.0014) (3.36E-05)
INFLSQR 1.27E-05 3.29E-08 ***
(3.39E-05) (6.60E-09)




MSGOV 0.0054 0.0222 **
(0.0067) (0.0112)
MP 0.3767 * 0.3873 **
(0.1988) (0.1579)
MPSQR -0.2224 -0.1264 *
(0.1147) (0.0682)354 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 3. (Continue) Region Specific Panel Results
Africa Latin America
MPEDUC -0.1230 -0.1948 **
(0.0851) (0.0907)
DEMOC -0.0068 -0.0080 **
(0.0078) (0.0040)
R Squared 0.92 0.94
Adj. R Squared 0.80 0.83
No. of obs. 67 62
Mean of dep. var. 0.0038 0.0001
Notes: * = 10%, **  = 5%, and ***  = 1% level, respectively. Standard error of the coefficient
estimate appears in parenthesis.  Regressions include both country and time dummies.
14 The test statistic = 1.68 ~ F(18,49), which cannot be rejected at the 5% level of confidence.
sample of countries from Africa, but are significant for the sub-sample of
Latin American countries. The military spending variables in either continent
equation in Table 3 fail to generate the same confidence levels as EQ1 does,
but the military labor use variable relationships are somewhat stronger in
both continent equations. Ultimately, comparing the pooled results in EQ1 to
the separate region regression equations in Table 3 reveals that the benefit of
pooling the data is primarily achieved via the reduction in the standard errors
of the coefficient estimates. Every coefficient estimate appearing in EQ1 from
Table 1 has a lower standard error than the corresponding coefficient estimate
appearing in either equation from Table 3. This is true even when the coefficient
happens to be larger in EQ1 than in either equation in Table 3. Furthermore,
pooling the panel data is supported by a Chow test.
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E.  Empirical Implications
It should be noted that the implications from our panel data analysis of
African and Latin American countries would not likely translate directly to
the experience of developed nations. Furthermore, these implications may
not apply to all of the countries of North Africa, since most of these countries
are not represented in our sample. Our panel data analysis of Latin America
and African countries implies that the defense burden on economic growth is
non-linear, and we estimate the point at which defense spending and military
labor use yields a maximum positive influence on economic growth.
However, our empirical analysis should not be interpreted as a suggestion
to use these inflection points for determining the optimal level of spending or
the optimal level of labor use for a nation’s military sector. The influence of
military resource use on the nation’s economy should never be used as the
sole criteria for determining optimal capital or labor allocation levels for the
military sector. Additionally, the positive results of male labor participation
in the military should not be interpreted as justification for increasing the
incidence of military conscription in less developed countries. Our analysis
indicates that the positive effects of military labor force participation on
economic growth can be expected only in the relative absence of adequate
civilian education and training opportunities for young men. The positive net
effect of male educational attainment on economic activity, when viewed along
with the negative cross-product of military labor use and educational attainment
of adult males, suggests that increased education and training opportunities
for young men would generate greater returns to economic growth than
increasing male labor force participation in the military through conscription.
Rather, the results of our empirical analysis can provide relevant economic
information as to the potential net economic impact of military spending and
labor use, as governments consider using different portions of a nation’s GNP
or employing different levels of a nation’s population for national defense.
In this way, the economic implications of defense burden can then be weighed
meaningfully along with the numerous national security concerns and other356 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
vital criteria when a nation’s government must identify their optimal level of
defense spending and military use of labor.
V. Conclusion
The unique contribution of our study is two-fold. First, we describe a
simple yet robust model of the defense burden on economic growth that
integrates the implications of disparate theories gleaned from the defense
economics literature and discussed in Deger and Sen (1995) and in Ram
(1995). Our model allows many of the various avenues by which military
resource use influences a country’s rate of economic growth to be revealed
empirically.  Second, we estimate the defense burden function that is implied
by this model using an augmented version of an established neoclassical
growth model developed by Barro (1991, 1997). We chose Barro’s model
specification because it is a neoclassical model that controls for cross-country
variation in political and economic institutional influences on economic
growth. Ultimately, our panel data analysis of Latin America and Africa
countries reveals that the defense burden function is non-linear for both military
spending and military labor use. Low levels of military spending and labor
use can have a positive influence on economic growth, but this positive
influence quickly turns negative at higher levels of military spending and
eventually turns negative at higher levels of military labor use.
We find empirical evidence that military spending during the period
analyzed has had a net negative influence on economic growth, and that
military labor use has had a net positive influence on growth, when each level
is evaluated at the sample average levels of military spending and labor use,
respectively. However, the positive influence of military labor use diminishes
substantially as the average level of male educational attainment in a country
increases. Our panel data analysis covered three separate, five-year growth
periods during the period 1975 to 1989, and the statistical results are based
on a fixed effects model using 129 observations from a sample of 44 countries
in Africa and Latin America. We control for the opportunity cost of lost human357 SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
capital in the civilian sector of the economy (Blomberg, 1996) and take into
account possible gains in civilian, public sector production efficiencies that
could be statistically correlated with increased military spending (Landau,
1994). Our empirical analysis suggests that the longitudinal dimension of the
panel data tends to influence these results more heavily than the cross-sectional
dimension.  Finally, a Chow test verifies that pooling the data from these two
continental regions into one panel data sample is statistically justified.
Appendix
Table A. Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviation)
Full sample Africa Latin America
No. of obs. 129 67 62
GDP (growth)  0.0020 0.0038 1.29E-05
 (0.0351) (0.0372) (0.0330)
GDP (level) 7.430 6.939 7.961
(0.7859) (0.6461) (0.5414)
INV -2.114 -2.346 -1.863
(0.5994) (0.6791) (0.3630)
GOV -1.772 -1.557 -2.004
(0.3752) (0.2504) (0.3495)
EDUC 1.154 0.8754 1.456
(0.5574) (0.5668) (0.3555)
LIFE 4.028 3.916 4.149
(0.1670) (0.1330) (0.1042)
FERT 1.657 1.834 1.446
(0.3060) (0.2256) (0.2647)
M1GROW 45.013 21.340 70.595
(112.62) (52.010) (149.68)358 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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